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Note
The Five-Year Like-Kind Exchange
Starker v. Commissioner, 75-1 U.S. Tax Cas.
87, 142 (D. Ore. 1975)
I. INTRODUCTION
Section 1031' of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides that
no gain or loss will be recognized if certain qualifying property is
"exchanged" for like-kind qualifying property2 rather than sold.
The recent case of Starker v. Commissioner,3 has extended the def-
inition of "exchange" far beyond the typical contemporaneous
swapping of property situation to which the section had previously
been applied.
II. THE FACTS
In Starker the taxpayers entered into two separate exchange
agreements with two corporations. Both agreements provided that
the taxpayers would transfer their timberland to the corporation
and the corporation would transfer like-kind property to the tax-
payers in the future. The agreements were very specific as to the
execution and timing of the transactions.
The agreement with Longview Fibre Company was entered into
on April 1, 1967. It provided that after the taxpayers conveyed
a warranty deed for the timberland, Longview would credit a spe-
cial "Exchange Value" account with $105,811.00. Longview could
transfer like-kind properties to the taxpayers and debit the "Ex-
1. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954 [hereinafter cited as CODE] § 1031 (a) provides
that no gain or loss shall be recognized if property held for productive
use in trade or business or for investment is exchanged solely for prop-
erty of a like-kind which is to be held for productive use in trade or
business or for investment. CODE § 1031 (b) provides for the situation
where the exchange is not "solely" for like-kind property. In such
case, gain is usually recognized to the extent of the other property
which is called "boot." This article will not include a discussion of
boot.
2. Like-kind is described in Treas. Reg. § 1.1031(b) (1967) as referring
to the "nature or character of property." Property of the same "class"
is like-kind property; therefore, exchanging improved for unimproved
real estate qualifies for nonrecognition of gain or loss.
3. 75-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 87,142 (D. Ore. 1975).
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change Value" account for the cost of such property so long as the
parties agreed in writing to the value of the property so transferred.
At the end of each year the amount remaining in the "Exchange
Value" account was increased by six per cent to reflect the increase
in the fair market value of the growing timber.4 The taxpayers
had no control over the cash used by Longview to purchase the
like-kind property nor any right to demand cash instead of prop-
erty. If any credit balance remained in the "Exchange Value" ac-
count on April 1, 1972, Longview had the right to pay it in cash
to the taxpayers. The effect was to give the taxpayers five years
in which to receive like-kind property from the corporation.
Longview conveyed eight separate pieces of property to the tax-
payers, the first on October 7, 1968, and the last on January 17, 1972.
During this same five-year period the "Exchange Value" account
was credited with a total of $17,012.67 for the six per cent growth
of the timber which was not yet "exchanged" at the end of each
of the five years. No balance remained in the account on April
15, 1972, and, therefore, no cash was received by the taxpayers. The
agreement with the other corporation, Crown Zellerbach, was essen-
tially similar and no cash was ever paid to the taxpayers under
this exchange either. The United States District Court for the Dis-
trict of Oregon held that both exchange transactions qualified for
non-recognition of gain treatment pursuant to section 1031.
The two main issues raised in this case were both decided in
favor of the taxpayers. The first one concerned whether the facts
of the case warranted a finding that the taxpayers' timberland was
"held for productive use in trade or business or for investment"
rather than primarily for sale, and whether the property received
in the exchange was also "held either for productive use in trade or
business or for investment?",
This issue was decided primarily on a factual basis and has little
import beyond the facts of this case. The taxpayers convinced the
court by demonstrating that the specific piece of property traded
and the properties received were never held primarily for sale
even though the taxpayers had sold other properties and timber
during 1965 to 1972.6 At the time of trial they held all the proper-
4. The taxpayers in Starker stated in their brief:
Growth per cent is a widely accepted forestry term and con-
cept totally unrelated to interest .... The 'growth factor'
was to cover as nearly as possible an equal amount of growth
between what plaintiff's land would produce to what they
hoped to get from delayed delivery ... 
Brief for Plaintiff at 8.
5. CODE § 1031 is not an elective provision; therefore, this first issue must
be answered in favor of the taxpayers in order to qualify for § 1031.
6. Is there a category of taxpayers who hold property "primarily for
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ties received pursuant to the exchange except one tract which had
been traded with the state for two other tracts. The taxpayers re-
lied on Malat v. Riddel 7 in which the Supreme Court defined "pri-
marily" to mean "of first importance" for section 1221(1) purposes.
The Oregon court agreed with the taxpayers and rejected the Gov-
ernment's contention that a purpose may be primary if it is a "sub-
stantial" one."
III. THE GOVERNMENT'S POSITION
The second issue brought the major triumph for the taxpayers.
As set out in the district court opinion the issue was "whether sec-
tion 1031 of the Internal Revenue Code covers transactions in which
a taxpayer disposes of all his rights in property for a promise from
the transferee to convey like-kind properties in the future."9 The
Government argued that the taxpayers had liquidated their invest-
ment in the timberland and had constructively received the "Ex-
change Value" when they transferred all rights in their land to
Longview and Crown Zellerbach and no further services or actions
were required of them. Pursuant to United States v. Davis,10 in
trade?" Timberland to be cut could continually be exchanged for
young timber. In this way capital gains could be avoided and a siz-
able estate accumulated. No doubt this occurs with all kinds of prop-
erty, but with timberland the increase in value is far steadier and more
predictable.
7. 383 U.S. 569 (1966).
8. Lurking in the background is the complicating factor of whether the
taxpayers are dealers in real estate. CoD § 1031 (a) specifically pro-
vides that property held "primarily for sale" does not qualify for non-
recognition treatment. A factual determination that the taxpayers
were dealers in timberland would disqualify them from use of § 1031.
This issue was sidestepped in Malat by both the taxpayer and the
Government. CODE § 1031, defining the types of assets which qualify
for non-recognition upon exchange, does not imitate the language of
§ 1221 which defines capital assets for determining capital gains and
losses. The phrase "to customers in the ordinary course of his trade
or business" is deleted from § 1031. The result is that a person can
be denied § 1031 treatment if he holds either the transferred property
or the received property "primarily for sale," regardless of whether
he is a dealer or in the trade or business of selling such property. See
Wineburg v. Commissioner, 326 F.2d 157 (9th Cir. 1963); Brooks Grif-
fin, 49 T.C. 253 (1967); Ethel Black, 35 T.C. 90 (1960). However, if
the taxpayers were shown to be dealers, they would have an even
harder time proving that this property had been segregated from the
start and that it was not held primarily for sale.
In Starker, the Government did not attempt this backdoor ap-
proach.
9. 75-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 87,143.
10. 370 U.S. 65 (1962). Davis was a case involving a divorce. In it, the
value of the marital rights given up by the wife was held to be equal
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an arm's length transaction such as this, the fair market value of
the property given is equal to the fair market value of the property
received. Therefore, the Government credited the taxpayers with
gain to the extent of the fair market value of the land in excess
of its adjusted basis in the seller's hands. The Government also
argued that the land was held primarily for sale in the ordinary
course of the taxpayers' trade or business, making the gain ordinary
and not capital and thus subject to the higher ordinary income tax
rates.1 Furthermore, it contended that the six per cent growth
factor was in essence interest and also taxable at ordinary income
rates. Finally, the Government argued that this transaction was
not a section 1031 exchange because trading timberland for a prom-
ise is not a like-kind exchange.
The Government's position on constructive receipt is supported
by Revenue Ruling 60-3112 which contains four examples of de-
ferred income agreements, all of which involve cash basis taxpayers.
In the first example, a wage earner defers income as it is earned.
In the second, an author does not report income until the publisher
receives money from sales of the novel. Both taxpayers are allowed
to report the income as they receive it in later years. In the last
two examples a baseball player attempts to defer the bonus pay-
ment he receives for signing a playing contract and a boxer at-
tempts to postpone the income he receives for fighting a single bout.
Both of these taxpayers are deemed to have constructively received
the income immediately and are not allowed to postpone reporting
and being taxed until later years. The income from boxing and
the bonus are single transactions in which no further actions are
required on the part of the taxpayers; earning income does not de-
pend upon future events as do the sales receipts of the publisher
in the author's case. The Government applied this same reasoning
in the present case, arguing that the taxpayers had done all that
was required of them, i.e., transferred the warranty deeds to Long-
view and Crown Zellerbach.
to the value of the stock given by the husband. The "exchange" was
made pursuant to an agreement incorporated in the court decree. Typ-
ically, CODE § 1001 (b) would require that the fair market value of the
wife's marital rights be established in order to determine the hus-
band's gain on the disposition of his stock; however, the Court in Davis
held that the amount of gain in a taxable transaction can be deter-
mined if either the fair market value of the property given up or that
received is ascertainable.
11. Under CODE § 631 the taxpayers could elect to treat the cutting of the
timber as a sale or exchange of § 1231 property, which would result
in capital gain or ordinary loss. An outright sale of the entire timber-
land appears not to qualify for this election.
12. Rev. Rul. 60-31, 1960-1 CuM. BULL. 174.
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The Government did not think these taxpayers would qualify
for the open transaction exception to the constructive receipt doc-
trine. Under this exception, taxpayers are allowed to report income
as it is actually rather than constructively received in those situa-
tions where the future payment is indeterminable.13 The transac-
tion was closed on April 28, 1972, when the "Exchange Value" ac-
count was credited with $105,811.00. With the exception of the six
per cent growth interest, the taxpayers could not argue that this
was an open transaction in which the value of the property given
or received was unknown. Once the value of the property given
is known, United States v. Davis'4 requires that in an arm's-length
transaction the fair market value of the property received equals
the fair market value of the property given. Therefore, income
should have been reported when the "Exchange Value" account was
credited.' 5
The Government also attempted to apply section 48316 to the
six per cent timber growth factor. If the transaction is character-
ized as a sale, the growth factor should be characterized as interest.
The taxpayers had completely given up legal title to their timber-
land, yet they had to wait for the exchanged properties. If they
were not credited for the timber growth, they certainly would have
wanted an interest payment to compensate them for losing the use
of their money. The Government found no difference for tax pur-
poses between retaining the growth of the trees or receiving a cash
interest payment.
If the transaction were deemed an exchange rather than a sale,
the Government had another line of attack. It compared sections
1033 and 1034 with section 1031. Under section 1033 a taxpayer
whose property is destroyed, stolen or condemned can reinvest the
13. In an open transaction, payments received go first to reduce basis, with
the remaining payments representing capital gains. There is no or-
dinary income, and the gain may be spread over a period of years
rather than concentrated in one tax year. For this reason, the IRS
will almost always argue that a transaction is closed. Burnett v.
Logan, 288 U.S. 404 (1931).
14. 383 U.S. 569 (1966).
15. Under the Government's argument, when the taxpayers actually re-
ceived all the "exchange" property, their tax basis was equal to the
adjusted basis of the timberland given up plus the amount of gain rec-
ognized when the account was credited. The tax basis in this case
was the fair market value of the property given up, $105,811.00.
16. CODE § 483 imputes interest to any sale or exchange where payments
extend for more than one year. Typically, no interest is stated in the
agreement. However, § 483 also imputes interest (ordinary income)
at five per cent compounded semi-annually whenever stated interest
is below four per cent.
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proceeds in similar property within a certain time period, 17 without
recognizing gain. Likewise, under section 1034 a taxpayer can sell
his residence and acquire a new one within one year without recog-
nizing gain. The Government argued that section 1031 specifically
does not provide for the sale-reinvestment approach because Con-
gress contemplated only a contemporaneous exchange of property.
In the present case the exchange was permitted to go on for five
years, four years longer than the statutory one-year reinvestment
period in section 1034.18
The Government's attempted analogy fails to consider the un-
derlying policies of sections 1033 and 1034. The main thrust of sec-
tion 1033 is to allow a taxpayer to replace destroyed, stolen, or con-
demned property without recognition of gain. The sale-reinvest-
ment provision is the only way to deal with the practicalities of
condemned property taken by the state or destroyed property re-
placed with insurance proceeds. The sale-reinvestment provision
of section 1034 also reflects the reality of the normal situation where
the homeowner sells his residence and buys a different one. In
contrast, however, in business and investment transactions, proper-
ties are often exchanged between parties without the necessity of a
sale.
Lastly, the Government argued that this case pushed the def-
inition of like-kind exchange one step further than any other case
and well-beyond the intended scope of section 1031. Never before
under section 1031 had a taxpayer released his "bundle of rights"
without contemporaneously receiving like-kind property.
IV. THE TAXPAYERS' POSITION
The taxpayers' approach was to bring themselves under the pro-
tection of section 1031. To do so they set up their exchange very
carefully relying heavily on the case of Alderson v. Commissioner.19
The Ninth Circuit, to which Starker would be appealed, held in
Alderson that the taxpayer's exchange qualified under section 1031.
In that case the taxpayers originally agreed to sell their property.
17. CODE § 1033 (a) (3) (B) specifies rules for determining the time period,
which is usually two years.
18. Some authors suggest that CODE § 1031 should be amended to include
the "sale-reinvestment" technique. See Note, Section 1031 Exchange
of Like Kind Property: A Court in Trouble, 22 Sw. L.J. 517 (1968).
Under this approach, CODE §§ 1031, 1033 and 1034 would be in harmony
on the sale-reinvestment type transactions.
19. 317 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1963). For a detailed discussion of Alderson
and its effect on tax planning see West & Chodorow, New Case Points
Up Planning Techniques in Tax-Free Exchanges of Real Estate, 20 J.
TAxATioN 52 (1964).
LIKE-KIND EXCHANGE
The parties then amended the agreement to permit a like-kind ex-
change if the second party could acquire the other property and
exchange it with the taxpayers within one month; if not, the origi-
nal sale for cash was to be carried out. The court found that the
taxpayers had wanted to exchange their property from the begin-
ning but could not find suitable property until the last minute.2
Alderson v. Commissioner, as the strongest case in the Ninth
Circuit for taxpayers, set the stage for the taxpayers in Starker
in two main areas. First, it established the principle that a tax-
payer may qualify for section 1031 treatment even though the other
party to the exchange did not assume the benefits and burdens of
the ownership of his property before exchanging it, but merely ac-
quired title solely for the purpose of exchange.21 Second, the court
20. A similar case was decided in favor of the taxpayer in the Fourth Cir-
cuit. See Coastal Terminals, Inc. v. United States, 207 F. Supp. 560
(E.D.S.C. 1962), aff'd, 320 F.2d 333 (4th Cir. 1963).
The closest case factually to Alderson is J.H. Baird Publishing Co.,
39 T.C. 608 (1962). In Baird, a three party exchange was executed
whereby the taxpayer deeded its Berryhill publishing property to a
realty company. While retaining use of the property rent free until
the realty company could acquire a lot, construct a new building and
transfer the building to the taxpayer. The realty company immedi-
ately deeded the Berryhill property to a Sunday school for $60,000 and
used the proceeds to acquire a lot and construct a new building. It
then deeded this new property to the taxpayer, almost one year after
the taxpayer had transferred the Berryhill property to the realty com-
pany. The tax court found that the taxpayer had retained beneficial
ownership of the Berryhill property and, therefore, the exchange was
"mutual and reciprocal" and qualified under CODE § 1031.
Although never mentioned in the opinion or briefs of the Starker
case, an argument could have been made that the taxpayers in Starker
also retained beneficial ownership of their property. Beneficial own-
ership of a publishing company involves possession and use of the fa-
cilities in order to continue publication of the magazine, while benefi-
cial ownership of timberland involves retention of the growth of the
timber although the pure possessory interest is of no value. The tax-
payers in Starker did retain the six per cent growth value of the tim-
ber. Therefore, arguably they retained beneficial ownership of the
timberland until Longview and Crown Zellerbach could find suitable
like-kind timberland. The taxpayers in Starker did not attempt this
approach, but instead, mounted a head-on attack on CODE § 1031.
21. The Commissioner has fought the application of CODE § 1031 to "fab-
ricated" exchanges. Because very few natural exchange situations
exist, taxpayers usually set up agreements that require the other party
to buy like-kind property solely for the purpose of exchange. If like-
kind property cannot be found within a certain amount of time, the
agreements provide that the "buyer" can give cash. The Commission-
er's position has not been successful in these cases. See Coastal Ter-
minals, Inc. v. United States, 320 F.2d 333 (4th Cir. 1963); W.D. Haden
Co. v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1948); Antone Borchard,
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in Alderson interpreted Commissioner v. Court Holding Co. 2 2 and
Gregory v. Helvering,23 two cases usually included as part of the
Government's arsenal, as supportive of the taxpayers' position.
These two cases have often been cited for the proposition that sub-
stance and not form should guide a court in determining tax trans-
actions. As stated in Gregory the issue should be:
Putting aside, then, the question of motive in respect of taxa-
tion altogether, and fixing the character of the proceeding by what
actually occurred, what do we find?
24
Court Holding Co. emphasized the substance versus form dichotomy
in the following way:
The incidence of taxation depends upon the substance of a
transaction. The tax consequences which arise from gains from a
sale of property are not finally to be determined solely by the
means employed to transfer legal title. Rather, the transaction
must be viewed as a whole, and each step from commencement of
negotiations to the consummation of the sale, is relevant.25
Typically, a taxpayer will structure his transaction in such a
way that superficially a Code section will apply. The Government,
relying on Court Holding Co. and Gregory, will ignore the steps
the taxpayer has taken and view the substance and result of the
transaction. However, in a like-kind exchange Gregory and Court
Holding Co. become the taxpayers' strongest weapons. Legislative
history supports the position that no gain or loss should be recog-
nized ". . . if the taxpayer's money is still tied up in the same kind
of property '26 and the courts have used Gregory and Court Holding
Co. in an atypical manner to support taxpayers who structure a
transaction with a tax-avoidance motive in which they retain an
investment in like-kind property.27 Any transaction in which tax-
24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1643 (1965); Mercantile Trust Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 32 B.T.A. 82 (1935). As discussed in the conclusion of this note,
the Government in Rev. Rul. 75-291, 1975 INT. Rsv. BULL. No. 29, ap-
pears to have accepted defeat. See Schaner, Tax Free Exchanges of
Real Estate, 2 U. ILL. L.F. 466 (1966) for a history of CoDE § 1031 cases
from Mercantile to Alderson.
22. 324 U.S. 331 (1945).
23. 293 U.S. 465 (1935).
24. Id. at 469.
25. 324 U.S. at 334.
26. H.R. REP. No. 704, 73d Cong., 2d Sess. 13 (1939).
27. Court Holding Co. and Gregory involved corporations which tried to
structure a transaction in order to take the best advantage of the Code.
The taxpayers lost in both cases; therefore, it is an anomoly to see
the courts use these two cases to support taxpayers under CODE § 1031.
Apparently, the courts feel that it is hard to abuse § 1031 when its
wording calls for the application of a "substance" test, i.e., a continued
investment in like-kind property. No specific outline as to the "form"
of the exchange is given in § 1031.
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payers start with business or investment property (not held pri-
marily for sale) and end up with like-kind property will usually
qualify for non-recognition treatment under section 1031.28
Even before Starker taxpayers utilized a myriad of imaginative
like-kind exchanges. 29 The number of parties, type of escrow,
transfer of titles, transfer of possession, timing of transfers, employ-
ment of agents, options involved, and types of property exchanged
differ in each transaction. The case law demonstrates only one
major constraint on the taxpayers' construction of such an ex-
change, i.e., they must avoid the receipt of cash or control over
cash.30 The result is a modified "substance over form" rule.
In Carleton v. United States,31 the taxpayer sold an option on
his ranch to a corporation, but reserved the right to require the
corporation to transfer like-kind property instead of cash. He then
found another ranch and instructed the corporation to buy and ex-
change it. The corporation entered into an option with the third
party and then transferred the option and the amount of money
required to exercise the option to the taxpayer in exchange for his
ranch. He in turn exercised the option and used the cash to buy
the new ranch. In substance, all that the taxpayer received was a
ranch for a ranch; however, the Fifth Circuit held that section 1031
was not applicable because receipt of cash indicated a sale. It did
note that section 1031 would have applied if the corporation had
carried out the original agreement and transferred the ranch instead
of the option and cash.
The Ninth Circuit came to a similar result in J.M. Rogers,
32
where the taxpayer sold an option on his land, but also retained
the right to require like-kind property in exchange. During negoti-
ations for the like-kind property the option was exercised and the
28. The courts, under the guise of "substance over form," have approved
the application of CODE § 1031 to situations which come very close to
sale-reinvestment transactions. In view of the legislative history
which indicates a congressional desire not to tax a continued invest-
ment in like-kind property, this judicial interpretation of § 1031 is jus-
tifiable.
29. Coastal Terminals, Inc. v. United States, 320 F.2d 333 (4th Cir. 1963);
Alderson v. Commissioner, 317 F.2d 790 (9th Cir. 1963); W.D. Haden
Co. v. Commissioner, 165 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1940); Antone Borchard,
24 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1643 (1965); J.H. Baird Publishing Co., 39 T.C.
608 (1962); Mercantile Trust Co. v. Commissioner, 32 B.T.A. 82 (1935).
30. The House debates on the Revenue Act of 1924 indicate that gain must
be recognized if property is reduced to cash at any time during the
transaction. See the debate between Representatives LaGuardia and
Green, 65 CONG. REc. 2799 (1924).
31. 385 F.2d 238 (5th Cir. 1967). See Note, supra note 18.
32. 44 T.C.126 (1965).
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taxpayer used the cash to purchase the like-kind property. Again,
the court held that the receipt of cash pushed the transaction into.
the sale-reinvestment category and outside the required exchange
transaction of section 1031.
The parties in Starker did not make this mistake since their
agreement made it clear that at no time did the taxpayer have the
right to ask for cash or control over the cash.
The Starkers did not have control over the cash used by Longview
Fibre to purchase like-kind properties selected by the Starkers in
exchange for their land. Nor did the Starkers have the right
under the contract to demand cash in lieu of property.
33
V. THE RESULT: A DECISION FOR THE TAXPAYERS
The taxpayers were successful in convincing the court that the
Ninth Circuit in Alderson had already approved an exchange in
which the second party acquired title to property solely for the pur-
pose of making an exchange with the taxpayer. Starker, however,
was different because the exchange was not contemporaneous.
How, then, did the court turn aside the Government's contention
that what the taxpayer really did was exchange timberland for a
promise, which is not like-kind property?
One possible answer is that the court was looking past the prom-
ise which the corporations had given to the taxpayers to what was
promised, i.e., that Longview and Crown Zellerbach would convey
timberland, which is like-kind property. Coupled with this is the
fact that the "Exchange Account" was unfunded which is strong
evidence that the taxpayers were really bargaining for timberland
and not cash. The court must have also been influenced by the
fact that no cash was ever received by the taxpayers even though
they could have received cash if the like-kind property were not
found within five years. It had already been decided that the pos-
sible receipt of cash does not destroy the section 1031 exchange as
long as there is an intention to exchange properties if it is at all
possible.34 The only problem presented by Starker which had not
been previously answered by the courts was the non-contemporane-
ous exchange element. The Code and Regulations lent no guidance
in this area. However, since the court found no other errors in the
taxpayers' transaction, and since a contemporaneous exchange was
not required by the Code, the court allowed section 1031 treatment
for the Starker arrangement.
Once the court adopted this viewpoint, the Government argu-
ment that this was a closed transaction was irrelevant since all like-
33. 75-1 U.S. Tax Cas. at 87,143.
34. 32 B.T.A. 82 (1935).
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kind exchanges are closed, i.e., the amount of value received is
known. And categorizing a transaction as "closed" does not neces-
sarily imply that it is a sale and not an exchange.
Not only did the taxpayers successfully avoid recognition of gain
on the exchange, they also avoided having to pay imputed interest
under section 48335 which applies not only to delayed payments un-
der a sales agreement but also to exchange agreements. The taxpay-
ers pointed out in their brief that section 483 (f) (3) specifically
states that no interest will be imputed ". . . if no part of any gain on
such sale or exchange would be considered as gain from the sale
or exchange of a capital asset 36 or property described in section
1231." From that basis they argued that since section 1031 is appli-
cable and no gain of any nature was to be recognized, no interest
should be imputed either. The Government conceded the taxpay-
ers' argument and did not contest the issue any further.
3"
A careful distinction must be made between "considered," "real-
ized," and "recognized." The Code uses the word considered when
describing the gain from the sale or exchange. The Regulations,
when referring to section 483 (f) (3) state that:
The determination of whether the exception of the preceding
sentence applies shall be made without regard to whether any
gain or loss is realized on the sale or exchange, whether any
realized gain or loss would be recognized or whether some other
provisions of law .. .applies or would apply, to some or all of
the gain. 38
The result is that under section 483 interest should be imputed
in the present case since the exchange was of a capital asset even
though no gain was recognized under section 1031. If it had relied
on its own Regulations the Government might have convinced the
court that the timber growth factor of six per cent was actually
an interest payment and $17,012.67 would have been recognized as
ordinary income by the taxpayers. If the court concluded that the
six per cent growth factor was not interest, then the Regulations
would require that five per cent 39 compounded semi-annually be
used as the interest factor. Under either approach, at least
$14,000.0040 should have been reported as ordinary interest income.
35. See note 16 supra.
36. The timberland was a capital asset in the hands of the taxpayer.
37. Interest was not imputed in Starker because the statute of limitations
had run on all the years involved in the exchange except 1967, the
only year for which the taxpayer signed a waiver.
38. Treas. Reg. § 1.483-2(b) (3) (i) (1966).
39. Treas. Reg. § 1.483-1 (c) (2) (1959).
40. The six per cent growth factor which was applied to the year end bal-
ances of the "Exchange Account," resulted in an increase in the ac-
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VI. CONCLUSION
The taxpayers' victory in Starker appears complete. Their main
argument was that Alderson v. Commissioner had already approved
an exchange where the second party acquired property solely for
the purpose of exchanging it with the taxpayer. On August 24,
1975, three months after Starker, the IRS issued Revenue Ruling
75-29141 which approved a factual situation similar to that in Alder-
son and cited Alderson as a reference.
The Government's main argument had been that Starker was
different from Alderson because in the former the exchange took
five years, while in the latter case the exchange was contemporane-
ous. On December 1, 1975, the Solicitor General withdrew the ap-
peal in Starker thereby indicating that at least the Department of
Justice agreed with the taxpayers in Starker. However, two ques-
tions still remain unanswered. First, what position will the IRS
take when the next non-contemporaneous exchange case arises?
Second, if Starker is good law, what constitutes a reasonable time
for making the exchange? The exchange in Starker took five years.
It is unclear whether a ten-year exchange will qualify for section
1031 treatment.
For the practitioner the Starker case will make the section 1031
exchange a far more flexible tool. As in Starker, cash must be
kept out of the "seller's" control both in the agreement and in the
actual execution. Another caveat is that the Government may
rely on its own Regulations and attempt to impute interest pursu-
ant to section 483.
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count of $17,012.67. Applying the five per cent factor to those same
year end balances would result in "interest" of at least $14,000.
41. Rev. Rul. 75-291, 1975 INT. Rsv. BULL. No. 29, at 17.
